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INTRODUCTION 
Grazing on public lands has been a matter of considerable controversy 
for more than a century.
1
 As the environmental, health, and additional 
negative impacts of raising non-human animals for food become more and 
more apparent and well-known, it has become clearer that using public 
lands in this way is contrary to public interest. While the number of cows 
and sheep grazing on public lands is small compared to the overall number 
of animals raised for food in the United States, grazing is the single largest 
use of federal lands, covering more than 250 million acres,
2
 including 
ninety percent of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands.
3
 And, in 
addition to the well-known environmental impacts—such as degradation of 
the land, destruction of ecosystems, and pollution of the water—animal 
agriculture is a significant producer of greenhouse gases, which contribute 
to global climate change.
4
 
Congress and the federal agencies responsible for managing our federal 
lands have long recognized the detrimental impact that grazing has on the 
lands and the environment. This knowledge has been part of the underlying 
basis for the various statutes and regulations that have been promulgated to 
deal with grazing.
5
 These attempts show a continually increasing desire to 
protect the natural environment and to address the damage caused by 
grazing. 
Currently, as much as two-thirds of the rangeland is in unsatisfactory 
condition.
6
 Nevertheless, the use of the range for grazing continues, and the 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. See George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public 
Rangeland Management II: The Common and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 22–23 (1982) (discussing 
the contentious, often violent, battles over range rights). 
 2. USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTIONS WITH 
AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION: GRAZING LANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (Nov. 2008), available 
at http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/agandenvironment/grazinglands.htm. 
 3. Joseph M. Feller, Ride ‘Em Cowboy: A Critical Look at BLM’s Proposed New Grazing 
Regulations, 34 ENVTL. LAW 1123, 1127 (2004).  
 4. See DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED: REMOVING LIVESTOCK FROM 
PUBLIC LANDS TO CONSERVE NATIVE BIODIVERSITY 126 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1999) (asserting that 
grazing has indirect consequences on the environment, including emission of greenhouse gases). 
 5. See Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, 43 U.S.C. § 1901(a) (1978) (addressing 
unsatisfactory rangeland conditions). 
 6. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED 91–191, RANGELAND 
MANAGEMENT: COMPARISON OF RANGELAND CONDITION REPORTS: REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL PARKS AND PUBLIC LANDS, COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR 
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federal agencies responsible for overseeing the rangeland show little sign of 
stopping or significantly reducing this use of the land.
7
 
The pressure to maintain grazing on public lands is substantial. 
Ranching is a significant part of United States history—particularly in the 
West—and Congress, agency leadership, federal land managers, and judges 
are loath to upset this tradition.
8
 While environmental considerations have 
significantly affected numerous uses of federal lands, grazing has continued 
to be a prominent use of hundreds of millions of acres of land despite its 
negative environmental impact.
9
 Not only is BLM failing to address the 
perilous health and environmental implications of global warming, but it is 
also subsidizing and contributing to them through its decisions on how to 
use the public lands. As explained in detail below, however, ending grazing 
on public lands is arguably within the power of BLM, the Forest Service, 
and other federal agencies. Ending grazing on public lands has also become 
an environmental imperative.  
Part I of this article will address the substantial negative environmental 
impact of raising animals for food. Focusing on global climate change, Part 
I will address the need for federal agencies overseeing public lands to 
consider this impact in their planning decisions. Part II will address the 
laws passed by Congress to govern grazing on public lands, the backdrop 
that led to their enactment, and how they have evolved to make clear that 
protection of the natural environment is a primary objective of federal 
rangeland management. Part III of the article will analyze court decisions 
recognizing both the authority and the obligation of the public agencies 
overseeing grazing to take significant steps to protect the rangeland and the 
surrounding environment. Part IV will analyze authority requiring federal 
agencies to address global climate change, most significantly the Supreme 
                                                                                                                                      
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1991) (discussing how federal land managers routinely 
authorize destructive livestock grazing without complying with federal environmental statutes). 
 7. See CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/public_lands/grazing/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 
2012) (discussing the continued use of range land). 
 8. See, e.g., Erik Schlenker-Goodrich, Moving Beyond Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 16 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 139, 140–41 (2001) (describing how courts, Congress, and BLM all discouraged the 
formation of a comprehensive public rangelands law). 
 9. See Joseph Feller, The Comb Wash Case: The Rule of Law Comes to the Public 
Rangelands, 17 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES LAW REV. 25, 26–27 (1996) (discussing how federal land 
managers routinely authorize destructive livestock grazing without complying with federal 
environmental statutes). 
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Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. Finally, Part V will address 
obstacles to reform and ways to address those obstacles. 
I. PUBLIC POLICY NECESSITY OF ENDING GRAZING: IMPACT ON SOCIETY OF 
RAISING ANIMALS FOR FOOD 
As noted above, the negative impact on the range from grazing has 
been well known since the nineteenth century. Grazing has had detrimental 
impacts on the soil and water, as well as the plant and animal species on the 
range. The negative impacts of grazing include: “[R]eplacement of native 
perennial grasses by shrubs and annual weeds, soil erosion, degradation of 
stream channels, loss of riparian vegetation, water pollution, [and] 
destruction of wildlife habitat.”10 BLM itself has long recognized the 
harmful impacts of grazing. In 1974, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia pointed to BLM’s report indicating the negative environmental 
impacts of grazing: 
 
Uncontrolled, unregulated or unplanned livestock use is 
occurring in approximately 85 percent of the State and damage 
to wildlife habitat can be expressly [sic] only as extreme 
destruction. Overgrazing by livestock has caused invasion of 
sagebrush and rabbitbrush on meadows and has decreased the 
amount of meadow habitat available for wildlife survival by at 
least 50 percent. The reduced meadow area has caused a decline 
in both game and non-game population. In addition, there are 
883 miles of streams with deteriorating and declining wildlife 
habitat, thus making it apparent, according to the report, that 
grazing systems do not protect and enhance wildlife values.
11
 
 
But the negative impacts of grazing go far beyond that. Grazing 
implicates critical issues of planetary and public health. Raising animals for 
food, in particular cows, has serious implications for our well-being as a 
society. Animal agriculture is one of the primary contributors to global 
climate change. A landmark study conducted by the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization concluded that animal agriculture emits 
eighteen percent of human-caused global greenhouse gases, more than the 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. Feller, supra note 9, at 1128  
 11. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 840 (D.D.C. 1974) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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entire transportation sector.
12
 Other experts have concluded that this number 
fails to take into account the true impact of raising animals for food and that 
animal agriculture contributes closer to fifty-one percent of all global 
greenhouse gases.
13
 Regardless, the number is significant and government 
agencies should be acting to address this dire threat, not contributing to it. 
Cows in particular release significant amounts of methane and nitrous 
oxide, which are incredibly potent greenhouse gases. Methane has about 
twenty-three times the greenhouse effect of carbon dioxide; nitrous oxide 
has 296 times the effect.
14
 Raising cows for food accounts for more global 
warming emissions than other foods.
15
 In addition to the impact of 
greenhouse gases emitted directly by animals, animal agriculture in the 
United States contributes to climate change through methane released from 
fertilizer and manure decomposition; land use changes for grazing and to 
produce food for the animals; land degradation; and fossil fuels burned for 
fertilizer, animal food production, and transportation.
16
 
Although much of the research has focused on cows in concentrated 
animal feeding operations (also called factory farms or CAFOs), that does 
not mean that grazed animals are not also contributing. In the United States, 
the majority of cows raised for food spend the beginning of their lives on 
pasture and their last few months of life in a factory farm.
17
 While part of 
our vision of grazing on rangeland in the American West involves idyllic 
pastures with happy cows spending their lives eating grass until they are 
killed, that is not the reality. Cows that end up in factory farms are the same 
cows that graze on public lands. So using public lands for grazing 
contributes to the factory farm system, which has numerous issues beyond 
global climate change, including significant issues of animal cruelty, 
pollution, and public health.
18
 
                                                                                                                                      
 12. HENNING STEINFELD ET AL., U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., LIVESTOCK’S LONG SHADOW: 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS (2006). 
 13.  Robert Goodland and Jeff Anhang, Livestock and Climate Change: What if the Key 
Actors in Climate Change are . . . Cows, Pigs, and Chickens?, WORLD WATCH MAGAZINE (Nov./Dec. 
2009), available at http://www.worldwatch.org/files/pdf/Livestock%20and%20Climate%20Change.pdf. 
 14. DOUG GURIAN-SHERMAN, RAISING THE STEAKS: GLOBAL WARMING AND PASTURE-
RAISED BEEF PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2011). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Steinfeld, supra note 12, at 86. 
 17. Gurian-Sherman, supra note 14, at 6. 
 18. See, e.g., Sarah C. Wilson, Hogwash! Why Industrial Animal Agriculture is Not beyond 
the Scope of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 439 (2010). 
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Moreover, the precise impact of grazing is significant. The Union of 
Concerned Scientists has looked specifically at the impact of pasture-raised 
cows.
19
 Because these cows gain weight slower, they emit methane and 
nitrous oxide for a longer period of time and, therefore, emit more.
20 
The 
impact is greater when the rangeland is in poor quality, as the majority of 
public rangelands are. Cows grazing on poor quality pasture produce four 
times more methane than those eating mostly grain.
21
 Other commentators 
have estimated the output of grazing cattle just on public lands in the 
United States to be as much as 258,329,206,200 liters of methane per 
year.
22 
This is equal to the greenhouse gas emissions of 705,342 passenger 
vehicles, 8,578,933 barrels of oil, or electricity consumed by 447,687 
homes.
23
 
Grazing also contributes to climate change because rangelands in poor 
quality are less able to store carbon.
24
 Healthy grasslands and forests could 
mitigate much of the impact of climate change by sequestering carbon.
25
 In 
the case of overgrazing, “land degradation is a sign of decreasing re-
absorption of atmospheric [carbon dioxide] by vegetation re-growth. In 
certain regions, the related net [carbon dioxide] loss may be significant.”26 
Scientists in India looked at the global warming impact of stopping grazing 
in the Barsey Rhododendron Sanctuary.
27 They found that removing cows 
(as well as a small number of sheep, buffalo, and yaks) from the area in 
question resulted in a difference of 585,000 tons of carbon over a twelve 
year period, which they calculated to translate into the equivalent of 
2,142,000 tons of carbon dioxide.
28
 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. Gurian-Sherman, supra note 14. 
 20. Id. at 3. 
 21. MICHAEL ABBERTON, RICHARD CONANT, AND & CATERINA BATELLO, U.N. FOOD & 
AGRIC. ORG., GRASSLAND CARBON SEQUESTRATION: MANAGEMENT, POLICY AND ECONOMICS: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON THE ROLE OF GRASSLAND CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN THE 
MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 170 (2010). 
 22. Mike Hudak, Cattle Grazing on Public Lands Contributes to Global Warming, 
http://www.all-creatures.org/articles/ar-cattlegrazing.html (last updated May 2010). 
 23. Id. 
 24. James C. Catlin, John G. Carter, & Allison L. Jones, Range Management in the Face of 
Climate Change, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. ISSUES 207 (2011). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Steinfeld, supra note 12, at 95. 
 27. SHWETA BHAGWAT, ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH: 
CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, ANALYSIS OF GRAZING EXCLUSION POLICY THROUGH A CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION LENS: CASE FROM BARSEY RHODODENDRON SANCTUARY, WEST SIKKAM (Nov. 
2011). 
 28. Id. at 17. 
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Another study in China similarly found that ending grazing for twenty 
years in the Leymus chinensis (grasslands in northern China) could increase 
carbon storage in the soil almost thirty-six percent.
29
 The authors 
concluded, “By implementing [grazing exclusion], the temperate grasslands 
of northern China could facilitate significant [carbon] and [nitrogen] 
storage on decade scales in the context of mitigating global climate 
change.”30 
As the authors of the India study note, the “[v]alue of this carbon 
sequestration is not limited to the geographic area of study site but rather a 
contributor to global reduction in net carbon emissions.”31 Taking action in 
the United States to address the contribution that animals raised for food 
make to global climate change would have another international impact: It 
would encourage other nations to take similar measures.
32
 This is 
particularly important because the global warming impact of animals raised 
for food in other countries is generally greater than in the United States.
33
 
In addition, continuing to use public lands for grazing worsens other 
impacts of global climate change: 
 
The particular impacts consequent to livestock grazing have 
ever-growing significance in light of observed and predicted 
climate change impacts in the Southwest including higher 
temperatures; reduced snowpack and earlier snowmelt; longer 
droughts; more erratic, but more intense precipitation events 
rushing over drought-stressed lands and further incising 
channels; vegetation die-offs; and the spread of invasive, exotic 
species. . . . The grazing cannot meet the meaning of a FONSI, 
i.e., no significant impacts; and it cannot be justified in an 
[Environmental Impact Statement] vis-a-vis reasonable 
alternatives of no grazing or greatly reduced grazing. The 
impacts are too many, serious, irreversible, and unavoidable 
given the current levels, frequency, and geographic extent of the 
livestock grazing.
34
 
                                                                                                                                      
 29. L. Wu, et al., Storage and Dynamics of Carbon and Nitrogen in Soil after Grazing 
Exclusion in Leymus chinensis Grasslands of Northern China, 37 J. ENVTL. QUAL. 663 (2008). 
 30. Id. at 667. 
 31. Bhagwat, Diwan, and Venkataramani, supra note 27, at 17. 
 32. Gurian-Sherman, supra note 14, at 7. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Mary O’Brien, Uneasy Riders: A Citizen, a Cow, and NEPA, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,632, 
10,634 (2009). 
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Global climate change threatens to end life, as we know it, with the 
impacts falling most heavily on the poor and inhabitants of the global south, 
and jeopardizes global stability. The well-known impacts of global climate 
change include: retreating glaciers, rising sea levels, thawing tundra, and 
increases in hurricanes and other severe weather events.
35
 “Natural 
disasters, droughts, and other changes brought about by global warming 
‘are likely to become a major driver of war and conflict.’ . . . Global 
temperature shifts may also hasten the speed at which infectious diseases 
emerge and reemerge.”36 Additional effects include “severe and irreversible 
changes to natural ecosystems.”37 Some regions of the world “are likely to 
suffer yield declines of major crops and some may experience food 
shortages and hunger. . . . The poor and disadvantaged, and more generally 
less advanced countries are the most vulnerable to the negative 
consequences of climate change because of their weak capacity to develop 
coping mechanisms.”38 
All of these factors, along with the authority analyzed below, provide 
significant reason for the United States to take the implications of raising 
animals for food seriously and for BLM to end grazing on public lands. The 
next section looks at the statutory authority governing grazing on public 
lands and the underlying reasons for the enactment of these statutes. It also 
argues that ending grazing is consistent with this authority. 
II. HISTORY OF GRAZING ON PUBLIC LANDS AND ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS 
THE DAMAGE: STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR ENDING GRAZING 
As noted previously, grazing is the most ubiquitous commercial use of 
public lands. The majority of land used for grazing is managed by BLM 
within the Department of the Interior. A small amount of rangeland is also 
managed by the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture. In 
addition to BLM and Forest Service lands (including wilderness lands), 
some grazing takes place in national parks, national monuments, and 
                                                                                                                                      
 35. Gowri Koneswaran & Danielle Nierenberg, Global Farm Animal Production and Global 
Warming: Impacting and Mitigating Climate Change, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 578, 580 
(May 2008); Steinfeld, supra note 12, at 80. 
 36. Koneswaran and Nierenberg, supra note 35, at 580. 
 37. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. at 521 (quoting declaration 
of climate scientist, Michael MacCracken). 
 38. Steinfeld, supra note 12, at 80–81. 
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national wildlife refuges.
39
 Although this article deals primarily with BLM 
decisions regarding management of the range and legal challenges to those 
decisions, these laws and arguments apply equally to the Forest Service and 
other federal agencies. 
For much of U.S. history, there were few attempts to regulate the use of 
public lands for grazing.
40
 Entities raising cows and sheep for food 
basically had free range to use federal lands.
41
 This use of the public lands 
was judicially sanctioned in the 1890 case of Buford v. Houtz. The Supreme 
Court held that “there is an implied license, growing out of the custom of 
nearly a hundred years, that the public lands of the United States, especially 
those in which the native grasses are adapted to the growth and fattening of 
domestic animals, shall be free to the people who seek to use them where 
they are left open and unenclosed, and no act of government forbids this 
use.”42 
However, at the turn of the twentieth century, as the damage caused by 
grazing started to be recognized, there were attempts to limit and regulate 
the practice. The Forest Service started charging fees for grazing in 1905.
43
 
There were several legislative attempts to address the damage caused by 
grazing.
44
 However, these attempts were largely unsuccessful. It was only 
after the environmental and economic devastation caused by the Dust Bowl, 
which was made worse by the long-term use of rangelands for grazing, that 
Congress finally acted.
45
 In 1934, Congress responded with the Taylor 
Grazing Act (TGA). It attempted to limit and regulate grazing on public 
lands and to address some of the environmental issues that had arisen from 
the indiscriminate use of the lands for grazing. 
Congress made additional attempts, through several subsequent major 
pieces of legislation, to address the environmental degradation caused by 
grazing on federal lands. Forty years after the TGA, Congress enacted the 
Federal Land Policy Management Act and the Public Rangelands 
                                                                                                                                      
 39. See Mike Hudak, To Graze or Not to Graze? Livestock Grazing on Public Lands Policy 
and the Sierra Club (1999), available at http://www.mikehudak.com/Articles/Chesapeake9909.html; 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 05-869, LIVESTOCK GRAZING: FEDERAL EXPENDITURES 
AND RECEIPTS VARY, DEPENDING ON THE AGENCY AND THE PURPOSE OF THE FEE CHARGED (2005). 
 40. See Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 1, at 27.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890). 
 43. DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED: REMOVING LIVESTOCK FROM 
PUBLIC LANDS TO CONSERVE NATIVE BIODIVERSITY 27–28 (1999). 
 44. Id. at 33–35. 
 45. See Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 1, at 47 (analyzing Congress’ motivation to 
promulgate the Taylor Grazing Act). 
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Improvement Act. While each of these authorities assumes that grazing will 
continue to take place on public lands, none of them requires the use of the 
lands for that purpose. Likewise, each of them makes clear that preservation 
of the range and other environmental values are of paramount importance. 
Concurrently, provisions in other laws that bind federal agencies, including 
the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, the 
Wild & Scenic Rivers Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act, 
illustrate that other countervailing policies must take precedence. Grazing is 
only one of many potential use of the rangeland and, because of its 
detrimental effects on humanity and the world, should be more stringently 
regulated. 
A. Taylor Grazing Act 
Despite its name, the TGA was not passed to authorize grazing on 
federal lands: grazing was already taking place on federal lands and had 
been for more than a century. The TGA provided BLM with the authority to 
issue permits for grazing and obtain “reasonable fees” from ranchers who 
wanted to use the public lands.
46
 As explained in further detail below, 
obtaining adequate compensation for the right to use federal lands for 
grazing has been an ongoing and largely unsuccessful process. The TGA 
also made clear that permits to graze did not convey any “right, title, 
interest or estate” in the land itself.47 Courts have consistently held that no 
legal rights inhere in grazing permits.
48
 This history makes clear that, 
regardless of traditional use for grazing, the lands remain the property of 
the United States for it to do as it sees fit. 
Most importantly, the TGA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to 
establish grazing districts on lands “which in his opinion are chiefly 
valuable for grazing and raising forage crops.”49 Therefore, by the plain 
                                                                                                                                      
 46. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1976). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (establishing that Congress did 
not intend to vest property rights when BLM issues permits); Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 719 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (contrasting tribal rights to land with those not inherent in permits issued to non-Indians); 
Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 1944) (affirming that Congress may extend land 
rights while executive agencies may not); Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d 1209, 1217 
(10th Cir. 1998) (maintaining that licenses to graze on federal lands are revocable and have never vested 
property rights); Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that fee simple land 
owners do not have a compensable property interest in adjacent federal lands). 
 49. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (emphasis added). 
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text of the legislation, nothing in the TGA requires the Secretary to 
establish grazing districts, and grazing districts should only be established 
on lands that are not suitable for other uses. Moreover, the law gave the 
Secretary the authority to withdraw land from grazing entirely if it could be 
utilized for a more valuable or suitable use.
50
 
The Department of the Interior has long recognized that grazing is not 
intended to be the primary use of the land. In response to a challenge 
regarding water rights, the Department stated in 1966: 
 
The Taylor Grazing Act is not just a grazing statute. On the 
contrary, it is a statute providing for an inventory of public lands 
and for the disposal of the lands in accordance with their highest 
use. Thus, section 7 of the act . . . provides for the classification 
of lands in grazing districts which are more valuable for 
agriculture than for forage or more valuable for any other use 
than that provided under the act (grazing). . . . Note that in the 
scheme of classification grazing is the lowest use.
51
 
 
In reality, however, the TGA did little to impact the way that rangelands 
were managed. Neither BLM nor the Grazing Service, the federal office in 
the Interior Department responsible for enforcing the law before BLM, ever 
undertook the necessary appraisal of the lands to determine whether they 
were “chiefly valuable for grazing.”52 Most of BLM-managed lands in the 
West were simply classified as grazing districts, grazing continued, and 
some narrow restrictions were placed on entities using the lands. In addition 
to the permit requirement to use public lands for grazing, the number of 
animals that could graze on a given plot of land was limited. But, for the 
most part, grazing continued, the damage to the lands and the surrounding 
environment continued, and BLM did little to stop the practice.
53
 
Even if lands had been found to be chiefly valuable for grazing, as the 
law requires, there is evidence that removing cows and sheep from lands 
                                                                                                                                      
 50. Id. § 315f. 
 51. Thomas Ormachea and Michael P. Casey, 73 I.D. 339, 346–347 (I.D. 1966). 
 52. See Schlenker-Goodrich, supra note 8, at 179 (explaining the Secretary of the Interior’s 
broad discretion when determining if land is suitable for grazing); Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: 
The Capture of Grass, Ground, and Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721, 755 (2005). 
 53. Donahue, supra note 52, at 755–56. 
12 VERMONT JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 14 
devastated by grazing could restore the ecosystems of the range.
54
 
Additionally, these lands “are now valued for a wealth of noncommodity 
resources, including hundreds of thousands of archaeological sites; habitat 
for thousands of species of wildlife; spectacular desert, mountain, and 
canyon scenery; and recreational opportunities.”55 This reality calls into 
question whether any public lands could truly be classified as chiefly 
valuable for grazing today. 
As a result of BLM’s failure to fully implement all the provisions of the 
law, the TGA did very little to achieve its intended purpose of improving 
the environmental health of the range. The TGA still governs grazing on 
public lands, but subsequent statutes and regulations have added 
requirements for environmental considerations and protections. Later 
statutes make even clearer that public lands should not be managed for 
grazing alone, particularly if there are more beneficial uses. 
B. Federal Land Policy Management Act 
The Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) was passed in 
1976, and, among numerous other provisions, amended or superseded and 
built upon certain portions of the TGA.
56
 It is the primary law governing 
BLM activity and deals with the management of the public lands generally. 
The law provides a number of policy statements and directives to indicate 
Congress’ strong environmental preference, and to aid BLM in overseeing 
the lands. Individually and taken together, it is evident from these 
provisions that use of the public lands for grazing is not necessarily 
consistent with the other dictates of FLPMA. FLPMA makes explicit that 
protection of the natural environment is of the utmost importance: 
 
Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States 
that the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the 
quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, 
air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; 
that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public 
lands in their natural condition; that will provide food and habitat 
                                                                                                                                      
 54. See Debra L. Donahue, Trampling the Public Trust, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 257, 
264–67 (2010) (analyzing case studies where reducing the number of grazing animals on public lands 
lessened environmental damage). 
  55. See Feller, supra note 3, at 1128. 
 56. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976). 
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for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide 
for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use.
57
 
 
While this policy statement does refer to providing habitat for domestic 
animals, it does not reference grazing specifically, and to the extent that 
grazing is considered, it is only one of many important uses of the land. 
This understanding is strengthened by other provisions of the law. 
FLPMA requires that BLM develop land use plans for the various lands 
it manages.
58
 Any decisions regarding these lands must fit within the land 
use plan for the area, and must be made according to the principles of 
“multiple use” and “sustained yield.”59 Multiple use means that all possible 
uses of the land must be considered. FLPMA defines multiple use as the: 
 
[M]anagement of the public lands and their various resource 
values so that they are utilized in the combination that will best 
meet the present and future needs of the American people; 
making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of 
these resources or related services over areas large enough to 
provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to 
conform to changing needs and conditions; the use of some land 
for less than all of the resources; a combination of balanced and 
diverse resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs 
of future generations for renewable and non-renewable 
resources, including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, 
minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, 
scientific and historical values; and harmonious and coordinated 
management of the various resources without permanent 
impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the 
environment with consideration being given to the relative values 
of the resources and not necessarily to the combination of uses 
that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit 
output.
60
 
 
This requirement builds upon the TGA’s requirement that grazing take 
place only on lands chiefly valuable for grazing. Using lands for grazing 
                                                                                                                                      
 57. Id. § 1701(a)(8). 
 58. Id. § 1732(a). 
 59. Id. § 1732(a). 
 60. Id. § 1702(c) (emphasis added). 
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often means that their ability to support other uses is significantly 
deteriorated if not eliminated entirely.
61
 This fact provides added authority 
for the idea that grazing is not compatible with a multiple use requirement. 
While using lands for grazing generally only allows for that single use, 
removing grazing from public lands would allow for multiple uses such as 
recreation, timber, watershed, and wildlife, all of which would be more in 
keeping with the intent of the statute.
62
 
Sustained yield means “the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity 
of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable 
resources of the public lands consistent with multiple use.”63 This requires 
that the land be used in a way that will ensure its continuing viability for 
future generations. The Supreme Court has described the obligation as a 
requirement to “control depleting uses over time, so as to ensure a high 
level of valuable uses in the future.”64 
Moreover, FLPMA requires that, in “managing the public lands the 
Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to 
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”65 Two of the 
requirements in developing land use plans are that BLM “give priority to 
the designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern”66 
and “weigh long-term benefits to the public against short-term benefits.”67 
The law also contemplates the total elimination of certain uses of the 
lands.
68
 
Only a small portion of FLPMA deals with grazing specifically. The 
rangeland provisions of FLPMA apply to grazing on Forest Service lands as 
well as BLM lands. FLPMA, like the TGA, requires the Secretary to assess 
the lands and make a determination of their suitability for grazing. The law 
then makes provisions for grazing fees “which [are] equitable to the United 
States and to the holders of grazing permits and leases on such lands.”69 The 
                                                                                                                                      
 61. See DONAHUE, supra note 40, at 114–59 (discussing the adverse effects of grazing on the 
ecological landscape). 
 62. Id. 
 63. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(h) (1976). 
 64. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 58 (2004). 
 65. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
 66. Id. § 1712(b)(3). 
 67. Id. § 1712(b)(7). 
 68. Id. §§ 1712 (e)(1)–(e)(2). 
 69. Id. § 1751(a). 
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Secretary retains broad authority to remove lands from grazing, and to put 
them to other uses and to cancel grazing permits.
70
 
Taken together, these provisions make clear that BLM must manage the 
rangeland in a way that allows for multiple uses, does not unnecessarily 
degrade the lands, and preserves the use of the land for future generations. 
Grazing does not comply with these important and overarching provisions. 
C. Public Rangelands Improvement Act 
Shortly after passing FLPMA, Congress passed the Public Rangelands 
Improvement Act (PRIA) in 1978 as a further attempt to improve the health 
of the range. PRIA was passed because Congress found that, despite 
previous efforts, “vast segments of the public rangelands are producing less 
than their potential . . . and . . . are in unsatisfactory condition.”71 PRIA 
provides added support for the proposition that grazing cannot be the only 
use of the public lands by requiring the lands to be managed, maintained, 
and improved for increased productivity “for all rangeland values.”72 PRIA 
further expands on the power of the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw 
lands from grazing by providing that it is within the power of the Secretary 
to determine that “grazing uses should be discontinued (either temporarily 
or permanently) on certain lands . . . in accordance with . . . the land use 
planning process required” by FLPMA, or as otherwise determined by the 
Secretary.
73
 
In addition, PRIA builds upon the system for collecting grazing fees for 
the use of the public lands. PRIA requires that “the Secretaries of 
Agriculture and the Interior shall charge the fee for domestic livestock 
grazing on the public rangelands which Congress finds represents the 
economic value of the use of the land to the user.”74 The law then 
establishes a process for determining the fair market value of land permits. 
                                                                                                                                      
 70. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a), (b), (f) (1976). FLPMA does contain a provision requiring that 
any “management decision or action pursuant to a management decision that excludes (that is, totally 
eliminates) one or more of the principal or major uses for two or more years with respect to a tract of 
land of one hundred thousand acres or more shall be reported by the Secretary to the House of 
Representatives and the Senate” and allows Congress to disapprove of such a decision. 43 
U.S.C. § 1712(e)(2). While this may put some limits on BLM’s ability to eliminate grazing on large 
tracts of land on which grazing is a major use, there are no similar restrictions for smaller tracts of land. 
 71. Public Rangelands Improvement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1901(a) (1978). 
 72. Id. § 1901(b)(2). 
 73. Id. § 1903(b). 
 74. Id. § 1905. 
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Despite this requirement, BLM has never received fair market value for 
permits granting the right to graze on public lands. Rather, BLM has 
subsidized the use of the lands for this purpose, contributing to the 
detrimental environmental impacts. 
Finally, in its findings and declaration of policy for PRIA, Congress 
points to a long list of environmental and economic impacts that result from 
using public lands for grazing. Among those impacts, Congress expressed 
its concern that “unsatisfactory conditions on public rangelands . . . may 
ultimately lead to unpredictable and undesirable long-term local and 
regional climatic and economic changes.”75 By specifically mentioning the 
climatic issues created by non-sustainable uses of the land, Congress 
expressed its desire for BLM to act to address these issues. Since that time, 
the need to respond to the pressing climatic changes has become even more 
urgent, and our knowledge about the contribution of animal agriculture to 
these changes has become much greater. While the substantive law of PRIA 
does not add much to the previously existing law, it provides additional 
ammunition for the argument that continuing to use the public lands for 
grazing is not consistent with congressional policy or public interest. 
Taken together, these statutes express Congress’ strong preference to 
limit grazing on public lands and to address the environmental imperatives 
of managing these lands. While Congress undoubtedly passed these laws 
expecting grazing to continue, it provided BLM with significant discretion 
to end this practice if the environmental damage failed to be addressed and 
the lands could be put to better use. Nevertheless, BLM has been reluctant 
to use its power to take a strong environmental stand in regards to grazing. 
The powerful interests that want grazing on public lands to continue have 
limited BLM’s ability to act. For the most part, grazing on public lands has 
continued even though it is incompatible with other uses, contributes to 
severe degradation of the lands, and limits sustained yield of the lands 
going forward. Even when grazing clearly conflicts with the mandates of 
land use plans, BLM is reluctant to significantly reduce or eliminate it. 
                                                                                                                                      
 75. Id. § 1901(a)(3). 
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III. GIVING MEANING TO BLM OBLIGATIONS AND AUTHORITY TO LIMIT 
GRAZING UNDER EXISTING LAW 
Prior to the mid-1990s, BLM acted on the assumption that its decisions 
regarding grazing need not comply with federal environmental law.
76
 While 
numerous other uses of the federal lands were significantly impacted by 
environmental laws and, as noted above, Congress made clear that 
environmental degradation was a significant priority in passing laws to 
regulate the rangelands, BLM continued to issue grazing permits without 
considering their environmental impact.
77
 And, as a general rule, courts 
allowed this practice to continue.
78
 Moreover, FLPMA’s multiple use 
mandate was considered meaningless by many.
79
 As a result, “BLM 
managers and rancher-permittees [had] come to assume that livestock 
grazing on public lands [might] continue indefinitely without environmental 
compliance.”80 However, in the 1990s, BLM began to take its authority to 
protect the environment more seriously. At the same time, courts began to 
enforce BLM obligations to make decisions regarding grazing permits that 
took into account the environmental impacts and were consistent with land 
use plans. 
The cases analyzed below look at how courts have dealt with BLM 
management decisions regarding the lands under its control and what its 
obligation and authority are to protect the environment under FLPMA, the 
TGA, PRIA, and other laws that govern agency action. The first section 
below looks at court decisions recognizing BLM’s authority to comply with 
the multiple use mandate of FLPMA and otherwise manage the rangeland 
as it sees fit. The second part summarizes court decisions recognizing 
limitations on BLM’s discretion and holdings that BLM has failed to make 
grazing decisions that adequately enforce the underlying statutes. 
                                                                                                                                      
 76. See Feller, supra note 9, at 36 (explaining that BLM has never explicitly asserted that 
grazing on the lands it manages is exempt from environmental laws, but that, prior to the 1990’s, BLM 
acted on the implicit assumption that grazing may continue without compliance with such laws). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 27–28. 
 79. See id. at 48 (explaining the argument of some legal commentators that the statutory 
language is too vague to be enforceable). 
 80. Id. at 28. 
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A. It’s Up to the Agency: BLM Authority to Use Public Lands as it Sees Fit, 
Including to Protect the Range from Grazing 
One of the most significant modern-day cases dealing with BLM’s 
ability to protect public lands from the damage caused by grazing is Public 
Lands Council v. Babbitt. The Tenth Circuit, and subsequently the Supreme 
Court, dealt with BLM’s authority under the TGA, FLPMA, and PRIA to 
issue regulations that aimed in part to protect the environment and called 
into question the long-standing privileges of grazing permit holders. 
Ranchers challenged portions of 1995 regulations issued by the Secretary of 
the Interior as violating the underlying laws.
81
 One of the primary 
challenges involved the Secretary’s decision to redefine grazing preferences 
under the TGA. A portion of the TGA states: “So far as consistent with the 
purposes and provisions of this chapter, grazing privileges recognized and 
acknowledged shall be adequately safeguarded.”82 Ranchers had long taken 
the position that this language required their use of the land for grazing to 
be given preference over other possible uses of the land.
83
 The Department 
of the Interior took the position that ranchers with existing permits would 
be given priority over other entities wishing to use the land to graze; 
however, they would not be given preference over other potential uses.
84
 
Existing permit holders were concerned that their permits might not be 
renewed if grazing were not given priority over other uses. 
In upholding most parts of the regulation, the Tenth Circuit noted that 
one of the purposes of FLPMA was to require that grazing permits conform 
to land use plans. The court went on to identify the purposes of the TGA as: 
“regulat[ing] the occupancy and use of the federal lands, . . . preserv[ing] 
the land and its resources from injury due to overgrazing, 
and . . . provid[ing] for the orderly use, improvement, and development of 
the range.”85 The court rejected arguments made by the plaintiff, Public 
Lands Council, finding that the privileges provided under a grazing permit 
entail nothing more than the authorization to graze for a specific period of 
time and a priority of renewal over other permit applicants.
86
 The court also 
rejected the argument that this interpretation threatened the goal of 
                                                                                                                                      
 81. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1292–93 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 82. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (1976). 
 83. Babbit, 167 F.3d at 1293. 
 84. Id. at 1294. 
 85. Id. at 1290. 
 86. Id. at 1298. 
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“stabilizing the livestock industry,” stating, “The Act clearly states that the 
need for stability must be balanced against the need to protect the 
rangeland.”87 The court further pointed out that “the Act treats stabilizing 
the livestock industry as a secondary goal. . . . [T]he actual text of the 
statute references only safeguarding the rangeland and providing for its 
orderly use as primary objectives.”88 The court added that “such privileges 
will be adequately safeguarded as long as they are consistent with the 
purposes and provisions of the TGA.”89 
The court went on to find that reading the TGA in concert with FLPMA 
further strengthened the argument that protecting the lands is the primary 
obligation of BLM and that the lands must be managed “for many purposes 
in addition to grazing and for many members of the public in addition to the 
livestock industry.” 90 The court also upheld regulations maintaining United 
States ownership of range improvements
91
 and removing a requirement that 
applicants for grazing permits be “engaged in the livestock business.”92 As 
explained in further detail below, the court agreed with Public Lands 
Council that BLM was not permitted to issue grazing permits solely for the 
purpose of conservation.
93
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision.94 The Court reiterated BLM’s significant authority to 
decide how to manage the public lands and to ensure that the rangelands are 
protected for future generations. The Court pointed out that “FLPMA 
strengthened the Department’s existing authority to remove or add land 
from grazing use, . . . while specifying that existing grazing permit holders 
would retain a ‘first priority’ for renewal so long as the land use plan 
continued to make land ‘available for domestic grazing.’”95 The Court 
noted that, even prior to the 1995 regulations, “the Secretary has always had 
the statutory authority under the Taylor Act and later FLPMA to reclassify 
and withdraw range land from grazing use.”96 The Court went on to hold 
                                                                                                                                      
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1299, n. 5. 
 89. Id. at 1299. 
 90. Id. at 1300. 
 91. Id. at 1305. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1308. 
 94. Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 750 (2000). BLM did not appeal the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision regarding the conservation permits. 
 95. Id. at 738. 
 96. Id. at 742. 
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that it was in the Secretary’s discretion to determine how to “safeguard” 
grazing privileges in terms of the entire purpose of the TGA.
97
 
Babbitt made explicit the idea that grazing can take place only if it fits 
within BLM’s land use plan for the area in question. Both of these opinions 
make clear that grazing is not the principal purpose of any of the three 
statutes. While each of these decisions assumes that grazing will continue 
and leaves open the question of challenging the regulations as applied, 
given the ever-increasing damage to the environment, both of these 
decisions provide an opportunity for BLM to show adequate reason to end 
grazing on public lands and still comply with the underlying laws. Courts 
have also upheld Forest Service decisions to remove land from grazing in 
order to protect the environment under similar requirements of the National 
Forest Management Act.
98
 
Other cases, while rejecting claims from environmental plaintiffs and 
upholding BLM decisions, have not foreclosed the possibility that BLM 
could act differently, limit grazing, or otherwise act in ways that are more 
protective of the environment. One of the most significant Supreme Court 
cases dealing with BLM decisions not to act to protect the environment was 
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Area.
99
 In Norton, environmental 
plaintiffs challenged BLM’s failure to limit off-road vehicle use in potential 
wilderness areas in Utah as violating the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and BLM’s land use plan under FLPMA. In rejecting the challenge, 
the Court stated, “The principal purpose of the [Administrative Procedure 
Act] limitations . . . is to protect agencies from undue judicial interference 
with their lawful discretion, and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract 
policy disagreements which courts lack both expertise and information to 
resolve.”100 
Similarly, lower courts have deferred to BLM decisions allowing 
grazing to continue.
101
 In rejecting a challenge by environmental plaintiffs, 
                                                                                                                                      
 97. Id. 
 98. See Nev. Land Action Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding the 
Land Resource Management Plan’s and its goal to improve the conditions of rangelands.); Perkins v. 
Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 804 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 18 
F. 3d 1468, 1481 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding Forest Service authority to close areas to off-road vehicle 
use). 
 99. 542 U.S. at 55 (2004). 
 100. Id. at 66. 
 101. See In re Mont. Wilderness Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 2d 990 (D. Mont. 2011); Wilderness Soc'y 
v. BLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113961 (D. Ariz. 2011); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 624 F. 
Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985), aff’d, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987). Similar issues have arisen in regards to 
off-road vehicle use with similar results. Gardner v. BLM, 638 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that 
 
2012] Cows, Congress, and Climate Change 21 
one court stated, “Although I might privately agree with plaintiffs that a 
more aggressive approach to range management would be environmentally 
preferable, or might even be closer to what Congress had in 
mind, . . . ‘courts are not at liberty to break the tie choosing one theory of 
range management as superior to another.’”102 Courts have given the Forest 
Service similar discretion to make land management decisions involving 
grazing.
103
 
Each of these cases makes clear that BLM has substantial authority to 
make the choices it feels are best in its land planning decisions. While BLM 
has often been reluctant to exercise this authority to limit grazing, that does 
not mean that the authority does not exist. Nothing in these opinions, 
however, requires BLM to take any particular action, including ending or 
significantly limiting grazing on public lands. The next section examines 
situations in which courts have held that BLM has failed to adequately take 
environmental considerations into account in making grazing decisions. 
B. Limits on Agency Discretion: BLM’s Obligations to Act to Protect the 
Public Lands from Grazing 
As noted above, until relatively recently, BLM generally did not 
account for environmental consequences when making grazing permit 
decisions, and courts did not require it to do so. One notable exception was 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton. In 1974, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia found that BLM had failed to 
adequately take into account the environmental impacts of grazing and that 
BLM was required to comply with NEPA in making grazing decisions.
104
 
                                                                                                                                      
BLM has significant discretion in taking steps to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of public 
lands); Sierra Club v. Clark, 756 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 102. Hodel, 624 F. Supp at 1058. 
 103. See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, 329 F.3d 1089, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 104. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff’d without 
opinion, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976); cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976). Many cases address BLM’s 
alleged failure to comply with NEPA. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 42 
U.S.C. § 4321(1970). NEPA is a procedural, not a substantive, statute. It requires federal agencies to 
comply with a number of requirements to consider the environmental impact of their proposed activities. 
It does not require federal agencies to take any given action. Nevertheless, challenges brought under 
NEPA require federal agencies to take a closer look at their activities, and they give courts an 
opportunity to explain the steps that they believe are adequate for agencies to take to protect the 
environment. Therefore, while NEPA itself does not provide BLM with authority to end grazing on 
public lands, analyses under NEPA are useful to look at steps that BLM could and should be taking to 
protect the environment. 
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Unfortunately, much of the promise of Morton was hindered by the 
“Sagebrush Rebellion” (discussed below) and backlash from ranchers and 
their supporters. 
A minor but significant shift occurred in 1993 when an administrative 
law judge held that BLM had failed to comply with NEPA and with 
FLPMA’s multiple use requirement in renewing grazing permits in the 
Comb Wash area of Utah and enjoined renewal of the permits. In 1997, the 
Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) upheld that decision. The IBLA 
stated that, while “FLPMA does not require a ‘specific’ public interest 
determination for grazing . . . FLPMA’s multiple-use mandate requires that 
BLM balance competing resource values to ensure that public lands are 
managed in the manner ‘that will best meet the present and future needs of 
the American people.’”105 Although some previous cases recognized BLM’s 
authority and obligation to protect the environment, this case took seriously 
FLPMA’s multiple use mandate and BLM’s obligation to consider the 
impacts of grazing in land use plans. Since that time, while imposing 
environmental limitations on BLM and on ranchers remains highly 
inadequate, courts have been more willing to require BLM to comply with 
environmental laws in making grazing permit decisions.
106
 
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether BLM had 
adequately considered the possibility of other uses in developing a land use 
plan that allowed for significant portions of land in southeastern Oregon to 
be used for grazing and off-road vehicles.
107
 The court found that BLM had 
                                                                                                                                      
 105. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 140 IBLA 85, 101 (1997). 
 106. This advance has been limited by Congress, however. Since 1998, because of the 
bureaucratic difficulties in conducting Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact 
Statements under NEPA, Congress has attached riders to the Department of the Interior budget 
appropriations, which allow BLM to renew grazing permits without complying with NEPA. See 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786 (2011); 
Dep’t of the Interior Act, Pub. L. No. 108-108, § 325, 117 Stat. 1241, 1308 (2003). While this issue has 
made it more difficult to bring cases under NEPA, see Great Old Broads for Wilderness v. Kempthorne, 
452 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75–76 (D.D.C. 2006) (explaining that BLM was burdened by an unusually large 
number of permit renewal, and because Congress was unwilling to impose the costs of BLM’s backlog 
on the region’s ranchers, it issued a series of appropriation riders that provided for the renewal of all 
expiring permits pending the completion of requisite review procedures); W. Watersheds Project v. 
BLM, 629 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (D. Ariz. 2009), and indicates the powerful interests that make reform 
difficult, BLM is still required to engage in the necessary environmental review when possible. In 
addition, other decisions made by BLM and occasions when BLM has made an effort to comply with 
NEPA are still challengeable. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that Congress’ action in an 
appropriation bill is not an indication of its attempt to amend a conflicting statute. See Tenn. Valley 
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (explaining that the Appropriations Committees had no 
jurisdiction over the subject of endangered species and that the appropriation measures are “Acts of 
Congress” with limited and specific purposes). 
 107. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 625 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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violated NEPA by failing to adequately consider the potential wilderness 
use of the land in question.
108
 Even though the court addressed off road 
vehicle use and did not directly address the issue of alternatives to grazing, 
the court did state that “BLM must consider closures of significant portions 
of the land it manages, including, if found appropriate on remand, lands 
with wilderness characteristics.”109 
Similarly, lower courts have enjoined BLM grazing decisions that did 
not adequately take into account the environmental impacts.
110
 In Western 
Watersheds Project v. Bennett, the court found that BLM had violated its 
duties under NEPA and FLPMA by renewing grazing permits despite 
substantial evidence that the range conditions were continuing to deteriorate 
and that issuing these permits was contrary to BLM’s land use plan for the 
area.
111
 The court enjoined further grazing on twenty-eight parcels on which 
ranchers had applied for renewals of their permits.
112
 The reasoning in this 
case has been followed by other courts who have agreed that federal 
agencies have failed to take sufficient account of the environmental impacts 
of grazing. In February 2012, a federal judge in Idaho considered whether 
BLM’s decision to renew grazing permits violated NEPA and FLPMA 
despite the agency’s own recognition of the detrimental environmental 
impact that grazing was having.
113
 The court pointed out that the decision to 
reissue the grazing permits was not consistent with the land use plan and, 
therefore, violated FLPMA.
114
 In 2011, a court held that BLM had failed to 
comply with the requirements under NEPA, in part by not considering 
ending grazing on the land in question: 
 
BLM's purported "No Action" Alternative involves grazing; that 
alternative required agency action through issuing new ten-year 
grazing permits. If BLM truly did take no action, then the old 
grazing permits would expire, no new permits would issue, and no 
range improvements would occur. No action would be no action. 
                                                                                                                                      
 108. Id. at 1124. 
 109. Id.; Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1114, 1145 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 110. See, e.g., Soda Mt. Wilderness Council v. Norton, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1261, 1263, 1271 
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (providing that BLM failed to conduct adequate environmental review by preparing an 
inadequate environmental assessment with respect to an amended land management plan). 
 111. W. Watersheds Project v. Bennett et al., 392 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225–29 (D. Idaho 2005). 
 112. Id. at 1229. 
 113. Western Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (D. Idaho 2012). 
 114. Id. 
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This is a reasonable, and obvious, alternative to issuing new 
grazing permits. BLM, however, dismissed a real no action 
alternative out of hand based on a mistaken understanding of its 
authority.
115
 
 
While the court allowed the permits to continue temporarily based on 
the permittees’ detrimental reliance, it instructed BLM to consider all 
alternatives, including no grazing. Similarly, courts have enjoined grazing 
on Forest Service lands when the Forest Service has failed to comply with 
environmental mandates.
116
 
At the same time, courts have been unwilling to recognize BLM 
authority to issue regulations that do not adequately protect the 
environment. In 1984, the National Resources Defense Council and other 
environmental organizations challenged regulations promulgated by the 
Reagan Administration that would have limited BLM control over lands 
leased for grazing and would have limited the environmental protection 
obligations of the agency.
117
 In particular, the plaintiffs objected to 
provisions in the new rule that provided for “Cooperative Management 
Agreements,” which would have allowed “selected ranchers to graze 
livestock on the public lands in the manner that those ranchers deem 
appropriate.”118 The court struck the regulations down as “contrary to 
Congressional intent and . . . enacted without proper regard for the possible 
environmental consequences which may result from overgrazing on the 
public lands.”119 
More recently, in 2011, the Ninth Circuit refused to uphold regulations 
that would have significantly undercut the protections put in place by the 
1995 regulations discussed above.
120
 The 2006 regulations were challenged 
as contrary to the TGA, FLPMA, and other federal law because they would 
have limited public participation in rangeland management decisions; 
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limited BLM’s environmental enforcement powers; and given the holders 
of grazing leases greater ownership rights to improvements on public 
grazing lands.
121
 The court found that the regulations were “arbitrary and 
capricious” and not in keeping with the underlying law: BLM had 
downplayed the environmental impacts of the regulations in the 
Environmental Impact Statement prepared under NEPA.
122
 The court stated 
that BLM’s decision to limit its role and the public’s role in overseeing 
range management was “inconsistent with the 1995 Regulations and 
discordant with the lessons learned from the history of rangeland 
management in the west, which has been moving towards multiple use 
management and increased public participation.”123 The court also found 
that the regulations violated provisions of the Endangered Species Act. 
While the court did not reach the challenge under FLPMA, the decision 
makes clear that BLM has significant authority to protect the environment 
but less authority to fail to protect the environment. In discussing the 
history of the case, the court noted that the TGA’s purpose was to “stop 
injury to the public grazing lands” and “promote the highest use of the 
public lands.”124 The court further noted that subsequent laws and 
regulations have further strengthened these priorities. The Supreme Court 
declined to review the decision.
125
 
These cases make clear that BLM has an obligation, not just the 
authority, to restrict grazing when continuing this use conflicts with other 
uses of the land and leads to continuing degradation of the range. These 
cases also make clear that land planning, not grazing, is BLM’s statutory 
mandate under FLPMA and other federal laws. If grazing does not fit 
within a land use plan, then it cannot be allowed to continue. As land use 
plans have grown more protective of the environment, grazing has a lower 
and lower priority as compared to other uses. 
IV. BUILDING ON EXISTING LAW: REQUIREMENTS TO ADDRESS GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN MAKING LAND USE DECISIONS 
The cases and regulations detailed above deal with traditional 
arguments about the damage grazing caused to the range. But, as noted in 
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detail in Part I of this article, grazing contributes to other pressing global 
issues, particularly global climate change. This is an issue that obviously 
cannot be addressed by ending grazing on public lands alone. Despite the 
vast amount of land that is used for grazing of animals, the number of 
animals raised for food on public lands is relatively insignificant. Of the 
more than 35,000,000 cows killed each year for food in the United States,
126
 
only as many as eight percent are raised on public lands.
127
 Ending grazing 
on public lands will not end the raising of animals for food, and animal 
agriculture is only one contributor to global climate change. Nevertheless, 
that does not mean that it is not a necessary and important step. The federal 
government should manage the lands in the public interest, using them in a 
way that is beneficial to society. At the very least, actions taken in our name 
should not be detrimental to our well-being. 
The Supreme Court dealt with a similar issue in Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency.
128
 The Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) had refused to regulate greenhouse gases released by cars under the 
Clean Air Act. Lacking the power to control global climate change on their 
own, the state of Massachusetts as well as other states, local governments, 
and environmental organizations filed a citizen petition urging EPA to 
act.
129
 In rejecting the citizen petition, EPA argued that it did not have the 
authority to regulate a naturally occurring gas under the Clean Air Act.
130
 It 
further argued that, even if it did have the power, it did not believe that 
regulating greenhouse emissions from vehicles was a wise policy 
decision.
131
 In addition, it argued that it was powerless to control global 
climate change, a worldwide phenomenon with many disparate and 
uncontrollable causes.
132
 
The Supreme Court found those arguments inadequate. The Court 
pointed to the dire effects of climate change including “a precipitate rise in 
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sea levels by the end of the century, severe and irreversible changes to 
natural ecosystems, a significant reduction in water storage . . . and an 
increase in the spread of disease.”133 The Court rejected EPA’s argument 
that “curtailing motor-vehicle emissions would reflect ‘an inefficient, 
piecemeal approach to address the climate change issue.’”134 The Court 
held that, while it is certainly true that EPA is without power to end climate 
change or to address the innumerable causes of climate change taking place 
outside of United States borders on its own, EPA has a duty to implement 
the laws passed by Congress and to protect the citizens and inhabitants of 
the United States to the extent of its ability.
135
 The Court also rejected EPA’s 
argument that, because another federal agency was tasked with setting 
mileage standards, it was without power to address vehicle emissions.
136
 
In affirming EPA’s obligation to regulate global greenhouse gases, the 
Supreme Court pointed to ongoing attempts by Congress to address global 
climate change, including the National Climate Protection Act, the Global 
Climate Protection Act, and the ratification of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
137
 The Court rejected 
arguments that these efforts evinced the totality of congressional action to 
address climate change. Rather, it looked to such efforts as evidence of 
Congress’ priority on this issue. 
The Court also pointed out that, “reducing domestic automobile 
emissions is hardly a tentative step. . . . [T]he United States transportation 
sector emits . . . more than six percent of worldwide carbon dioxide 
emissions.”138 The Court further noted that “[a] reduction in domestic 
emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter 
what happens elsewhere.”139 
As noted previously, animal agriculture is a greater contributor to 
global climate change than transportation. While ending grazing on federal 
public lands is a small step, it is a crucial one and one that BLM must take 
to address this pressing environmental crisis. According to the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, addressing the climate change impact of raising cows 
for food “offers an opportunity to curb a small, but measurable, amount of 
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U.S. heat-trapping emissions.”140 And, as other experts have noted, “this 
approach would have far more rapid effects on [greenhouse gas] emissions 
and their atmospheric concentrations—and thus on the rate that the climate 
is warming—than actions to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy.”141 
BLM and other federal agencies operate under the same framework as 
EPA. The fact that the Department of the Interior is not the federal agency 
specifically tasked with addressing environmental degradation does not 
relieve it of responsibility to address global climate change when directly 
implicated by its land use decisions. This reality is all the more true given 
the environmental mandates in all of the statutes governing grazing on 
public lands. The statutes and regulations governing management of the 
range make clear that environmental protection is a priority, and numerous 
additional statutory provisions make clear that that includes global climate 
change. Continuing to use federal lands in a way that is detrimental to the 
environment and to public health violates those duties. 
The power of the Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA is buttressed 
by the fact that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has 
concluded that federal agencies have the authority to alter their practices to 
respond to climate change. In a 2007 report, GAO concluded: “Because 
there is growing evidence that climate change is likely to have wide-
ranging consequences for the nation’s land and water resources, elevating 
the importance of the issue in their respective strategies and plans would 
enable BLM [and the Forest Service] to provide effective long-term 
stewardship of the resources.”142 
In addition, BLM is bound by the Clean Air Act. One of the main 
purposes of the Clean Air Act is to “to protect and enhance the quality of 
the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and 
the productive capacity of the population.”143 The Act requires the 
Administrator of the EPA to “cooperate with and encourage cooperative 
activities by all Federal departments and agencies having functions relating 
to the prevention and control of air pollution, so as to assure the utilization 
in the federal air pollution control program of all appropriate and available 
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facilities and resources within the Federal Government.”144 Thus far, EPA 
regulation of animal agriculture under the Clean Air Act has been limited, 
and in its regulations carrying out the Supreme Court’s dictates following 
Massachusetts v. EPA, it has exempted certain entities including animal 
agriculture.
145
 But that does not mean that it does not have the power.
146
 
And opponents of such regulation seemingly concede that EPA has that 
authority.
147
 In June, a representative of the American Farm Bureau 
Federation argued that by identifying greenhouse gases as pollutants under 
the Clean Air Act, EPA is obligated at some point to require permits for 
most animal agriculture entities under current law.
148
 He further pointed out 
that the vast majority of animal agriculture operations, including seventy-
two percent of entities raising cows for food, would be required to obtain 
permits (at significant expense) under the existing requirements.
149
 
BLM has recognized its obligation to comply with the Clean Air Act 
and to protect air quality and climate, including under FLPMA’s mandate to 
prevent “unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”150 BLM’s Air 
Resource Management Manual states, “incorporating climate information 
into the BLM’s programs, projects, activities, and decisions . . . is critical 
for effective management and relevant environmental review.”151 The 
manual goes on to identify BLM policy in regards to climate change: “BLM 
should consider climate and potential or documented climate change as part 
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of its planning and decision making process.”152 The manual then identifies 
a number of areas that the Bureau should evaluate covering, “how BLM 
management practices may or may not contribute to the potential effects of 
climate change, including but not limited to emissions, sequestration, or 
mitigation of greenhouse gases.”153 
In addition, the Department of the Interior has taken other steps that 
evince its responsibilities to address climate change. The Secretary has 
issued orders “requiring Interior bureaus to analyze climate change in plans 
and policies;” and requiring “coordination among federal agencies to 
promote . . . carbon capture and storage, and climate adaptation.”154 
Moreover, Department regulations require BLM to assess the conditions of 
the rangeland and make changes in livestock management if grazing is a 
factor in creating poorly functioning conditions.
155
 
As noted above, the federal statutes governing grazing on public lands 
already provide BLM and the Forest Service with authority to restrict or 
end grazing on the lands. The vital need to address global climate change, 
and the authorities described in this section provide added weight to BLM’s 
ability to act and additional and important confirmation of BLM’s 
obligation to end grazing on public lands. 
V. HOW DO WE GET FROM HERE TO THERE: ADDRESSING OBSTACLES TO 
REFORM 
The above analysis provides significant basis and purpose for BLM to 
end grazing on public lands. The environmental impact of using public 
lands for grazing is severe, long-lasting, and has been recognized for more 
than a century. Animal agriculture’s considerable contribution to the global 
devastation caused by climate change makes that impact more profound. 
Congress has provided BLM with authority to address this serious issue on 
several occasions. Additionally, courts have recognized BLM’s authority 
and obligation to act. This paper builds on that of experts who have, for 
decades, pointed to BLM’s authority and obligation to end grazing on 
public lands: 
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None of the aforementioned laws pose an obstacle to BLM taking 
the necessary steps to end grazing on public lands. This includes, 
where necessary, BLM removing livestock from the area to be 
protected. On the contrary, affirmative steps to conserve 
biodiversity would facilitate BLM compliance with several 
legislative mandates, including: managing the public lands for 
sustainable uses (FLPMA), avoiding unnecessary or undue 
degradation of public lands (FLPMA), conserving threatened and 
endangered species (ESA), and restoring the biological integrity of 
surface waters (CWA). A biodiversity conservation strategy calling 
for reduction or elimination of livestock grazing on arid BLM 
lands would enhance BLM’s ability to comply with the letter and 
spirit of the CWA, state water quality law, NEPA, ESA, and 
FLPMA.
156
 
 
Nevertheless, the chance of ending grazing on public lands remains at 
most a remote possibility. Despite the legal authority and the perils of 
failing to act, powerful interests prevent reform from taking place. The final 
section of this paper addresses three obstacles to reform: ranchers and the 
position they hold in the American mystique, concerns about the economic 
impact of ending grazing on public lands, and conflicting theories about the 
limits of BLM authority. 
A. Changes to a Way of Life (Who’s Really in Charge?) 
For the most part, the desire to maintain grazing on public lands arises 
from a romanticization of a way of life that Americans see as central to our 
view of ourselves as a country. The idea of cowboys on the range is a key 
part of that vision. However, to the extent that that way of life ever existed, 
it is a thing of the past. The majority of ranches are not run by families or 
individuals; they are run either by large corporations
157
 or by wealthy 
hobbyists who do not need or want to make a living from ranching.
158
 
Debra L. Donahue has explained in detail the way in which grazing on 
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public lands continues despite the small numbers of ranchers, low economic 
impact, and detrimental environmental consequences.
159
 Donahue details 
how the animal agriculture industry has “captured” the management of the 
public lands through establishing property rights in the resource, controlling 
the agencies that are supposed to regulate the industry, and capturing 
American life and culture through the cowboy myth.
160
 She argues that the 
way the “range livestock industry has exploited the capture metaphor is 
unequalled and that, unless checked, it is likely to be disastrous for public 
lands.”161 
This is a way of life that many in the west and their advocates are 
willing to protect at nearly any cost. The so-called Sagebrush Rebellion in 
the 1970s, in which several western state legislatures—responding to 
federal law and successful court cases—passed bills purportedly taking 
state ownership of BLM lands, exemplified this fact.
162
 The Sagebrush 
Rebellion culminated in the election of Ronald Reagan, who brought its 
theories and individuals with him to Washington.
163
 While the “rebels” did 
not succeed in transferring significant portions of BLM lands to state or 
private ownership, they did succeed in significantly weakening BLM and 
Forest Service management of the range.
164
 That mindset continues to exist 
within ranchers and representatives of western states. And some are willing 
to engage in or threaten violence to maintain this way of life.
165
 
This reality represents the greatest obstacle to reforming public 
rangeland policy and ending grazing on public lands. However, as 
explained in detail above, this obstacle is not a legal obstacle. Federal 
courts have refused to recognize a right in the public lands that states and 
ranchers have demanded. Similarly, there is no legal requirement for 
grazing to retain its special status under existing law. Rather, the reverse is 
true: BLM’s obligations do not change despite the considerable political 
pressure to maintain the status quo. 
                                                                                                                                      
 159. Donahue, supra note 52, at 803–04. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 723. 
 162. See Jacobs, supra note 157, at 456–57 (providing a description of the Sagebrush 
Rebellion). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Donahue, supra note 43, at 106 (relaying stories of western lawlessness, specifically 
violent confrontations between ranchers, farmers, and agency officials); ERIK MARCUS, VEGAN: THE 
NEW ETHICS OF EATING 181–82 (2001); Keith Rogers, BLM Warns It Will Round Up Rancher’s Cattle 
From Public Land, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., http://www.lvrj.com/news/blm-warns-it-will-round-up-rancher-
s-cattle-from-public-land-146948495.html (last updated Apr. 11, 2012). 
2012] Cows, Congress, and Climate Change 33 
B. Purported Economic Impacts of Ending Grazing 
Often, concerns about ending grazing on public lands stem from the 
economic impact this decision would have on local communities. As Debra 
L. Donahue has pointed out, and as fully documented above, the relevant 
agencies have not:  
 
[R]easonably justified livestock grazing under the planning or 
management criteria of their principal land management 
statutes. . . . Instead, grazing is rationalized as a means of 
sustaining small communities, maintaining open spaces on 
private lands, and preserving an important western way of life 
and culture. The governing statutes, however, confer on BLM 
and Forest Service no authority, much less a mandate, to promote 
local economic or lifestyle concerns or to regulate development 
on private lands.
166
 
 
In National Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, the court seemed to 
confirm that ending grazing on public lands was not a viable economic 
alternative. The court stated: 
 
[T]he complete abandonment of grazing in the Reno planning 
area is practically unthinkable as a policy choice; it would 
involve monetary losses to the ranching community alone of 
nearly 4 million dollars and 290 jobs, not to mention 
unquantifiable social impacts. Of course, compared with the 
economy of the Reno area as a whole, ranching plays only a 
negligible role. Nevertheless, eliminating all grazing would 
have extreme impacts on this small community. A ‘no grazing’ 
policy is simply not a ‘reasonable alternative’ for this particular 
area.
167
 
 
As noted previously, BLM has acted under an assumption that it does 
not have the authority to seriously consider ending grazing on public 
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lands.
168
 However, even taking the economic impact into account, grazing 
on public lands cannot be justified: 
 
Federal grazing fee revenues . . . are swamped by the costs of 
administering the range program. Average returns to ranchers range 
from negative to two to four percent. Only two percent of U.S. 
beef cattle production is attributable to public lands, an amount 
easily replaceable by other regions and private-land operators. 
Similarly, the 18,000 low-wage jobs directly related to federal land 
grazing could be replaced in a matter of days by normal job and 
income growth in the national economy. . . . [F]ew if any western 
communities are dependent economically on public-land grazing. 
On the contrary, the services and employment opportunities 
afforded by small towns help sustain public land ranchers.
169
 
 
A 1994 Department of the Interior Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement, issued in regards to the regulations discussed in Part III. A. 
above, estimated that stopping all grazing on federal lands would only 
result in job losses of 18,300 and would negligibly affect the cost of cow 
flesh.
170
 
As noted above, the laws governing grazing on public lands all call for 
grazing fees to be paid by permittees. However, the grazing fees have never 
been high enough to achieve their objective of helping to provide better 
care of the lands. The grazing fee has seldom been raised since PRIA was 
enacted.
171
 In 1986, President Reagan issued an executive order setting the 
fee at no less than $1.35 per animal unit month (AUM, the amount of 
forage needed by one cow for one month).
172
 That amount, substantially 
less than the fair market value in 1986, has remained relatively constant for 
                                                                                                                                      
 168. See, e.g., W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39364 (D. Idaho 2009) 
(noting that BLM has concluded that it has no legal authority to consider a “no grazing” alternative.); 
Rosenkrance, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1288 (describing BLM’s “No Action Alternative” and the agency’s 
subsequent rejection of said alternative). 
 169. Donahue, supra note 52 at 728–730. 
 170. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RANGELAND REFORM, ’94: 
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4-118 to 4-121 (1994). 
 171. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-869, LIVESTOCK GRAZING: FEDERAL 
EXPENDITURES AND RECEIPTS VARY, DEPENDING ON THE AGENCY AND THE PURPOSE OF THE FEE 
CHARGED 83, 85 (2005) (outlining fee data from 1979-2004 and fee results for 1980-2005). 
 172. Exec. Order No. 12548, 51 Fed. Reg. 5985, (1986). 
2012] Cows, Congress, and Climate Change 35 
the last twenty-five years.
173
 In 1980, BLM charged $2.36 and the Forest 
Service $2.41 per AUM.
174
 That amount was gradually reduced until it fell 
to $1.35 in 1985.
175
 The rate has been raised on several occasions since that 
time, but has not risen above $2 since 1981.
176
 Most years, it has remained 
at $1.35,
177
 and that is where the rate currently sits.
178
 
As a result, entities who use public lands for grazing receive a 
substantial government subsidy. GAO has estimated that taxpayers pay 
approximately $144 million per year managing federal lands for grazing.
179
 
Only $21 million is recouped in grazing fees.
180
 The government would 
need to charge at least $7.64 per AUM for grazing on BLM lands and 
$12.26 for grazing on Forest Service lands just to recoup the investment 
made.
181
 States and private entities charge significantly more for use of their 
lands for grazing.
182
 
Clearly, using public lands for grazing—in addition to having 
detrimental environmental effects—is not the best economic use of the 
lands: 
 
In 1991, public land grazing fees for the entire U.S. raised just 
under 30 million dollars. The beneficiaries of this government 
bonanza are a relative handful of elite range ranchers. Research by 
Fortune magazine reveals that the nation’s 28,700 livestock 
permits are controlled by only 2.5 percent of all American 
ranchers, and half of the permits go to just a quarter of a percent of 
all ranchers. These permit holders pay one-quarter the price that 
they would pay for comparable leases on private land.
183
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However, simply looking at what ranchers would be paying under a fair 
market system is not a realistic analysis of the economic impact of ending 
grazing. Even if the rates were raised to the amount necessary to manage 
the lands, the environmental and public health impacts of this use of the 
land would not be taken into account. As a result, the economic vitality of 
continuing to engage in this industry is propped up. Requiring ranchers to 
pay the true value of grazing on public lands would change the calculus for 
them and for courts assessing the economic considerations of continuing to 
use the lands in this fashion. There are many more economic benefits to 
ending grazing on public lands, both to the United States and to local 
communities, than to continuing it. And, regardless of the economic impact, 
there is nothing in FLPMA or other federal laws that requires the economic 
impact on the rancher or the surrounding community to be a consideration 
in issuing grazing permits. 
C. Limitations on BLM’s Authority to Protect the Range? 
As noted above, many courts have found that BLM has acted outside of 
its authority in failing to protect the environment. Few courts have held that 
BLM exceeded its authority in making decisions to protect the 
environment. Moreover, cases in which courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have held that BLM need not act to protect the environment, do not 
preclude it from doing so. Courts have long held that, while the land 
management decisions of BLM may be questionable, making decisions 
about grazing remains in the Secretary’s discretion. 
One case in which a court held that BLM had exceeded its authority 
under the TGA is the Tenth Circuit’s decision, discussed previously, in 
Public Lands Council v. Babbitt. The court held that BLM did not have the 
authority to issue grazing permits for the purpose of conservation. The 
regulations would have allowed BLM to issue permits for a use that 
specifically excluded livestock grazing.
184
 The purported authority for this 
provision was section three of the TGA, which allows the Secretary to 
“issue permits to graze livestock” on public lands.185 The court found that 
the intent of Congress on this point was unambiguous and that there was no 
room for the agency to interpret it differently: “[L]and that [the Secretary] 
has designated as ‘chiefly valuable for grazing livestock’ will be completely 
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excluded from grazing use.”186 However, this holding says nothing about 
BLM’s authority to remove land from grazing entirely, an authority, 
which—as fully documented above—it clearly has. The court went on to 
state that “the Secretary [has] very broad authority to manage the public 
lands, including the authority to ensure that range resources are preserved. 
Permissible ends such as conservation, however, do not justify unauthorized 
means.”187 
As noted above, BLM has taken the position that it cannot end grazing 
on public lands. But the limits on BLM’s authority are largely self-imposed. 
BLM decisions are entitled to substantial discretion and should be upheld 
unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law”188 or unless they are contrary to the 
unambiguous intent of Congress.
189
 The underlying statutes provide BLM 
with significant discretion to act as it sees fit; the language of FLPMA 
“breathes discretion at every pore.”190 Other commentators have noted that: 
 
Conservation-oriented actions, such as the designation and 
management of areas of critical environmental concern, and 
management for scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, 
environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and 
archeological values, are authorized in broad but definitive strokes. 
Conversely, resource exploitive actions such as grazing are 
authorized in more narrow strokes due to functional limitations 
imposed by FLPMA’s mandate to not permanently impair the 
productivity of the land and quality of the environment or cause 
unnecessary or undue degradation.
191
 
 
Each of the authorities explored above gives BLM responsibility for 
protecting the environment as a primary objective. A decision to end 
grazing on public lands is clearly beyond the power that BLM considers it 
has or the power thus far recognized by the federal courts. Nevertheless, 
protecting the environment and public health for future generations is a 
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fundamental objective of Congress and of the agencies carrying out its 
objectives. The statutes providing authority to BLM and the Forest Service, 
other federal laws requiring protection of the environment, and the cases 
interpreting these laws and authorities all provide ample support for 
significantly reducing or ending grazing on public lands. BLM has the 
authority to act to truly protect the rangelands from the long-term damages 
of overgrazing. It simply has to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has long recognized the detrimental effects that grazing has 
on the public lands. For this reason and others, Congress has given BLM, 
the Forest Service, and other public agencies ample authority to make 
decisions that are protective of the environment. Those agencies, however, 
have not always been willing to take this authority and use it to improve 
environmental conditions. However, the issues facing the world are 
growing and serious. Congress is not always able to act quickly and 
effectively to address some of the major issues of our time. Administrative 
agencies, however, are better able to act quickly and should take the 
authority given to them to take actions in the public interest and in the 
interests of the natural environment and humanity. 
While ending grazing is not a sufficient step to address these serious 
and intractable problems, it is a necessary and a significant step. At the very 
least, the federal government should not be using its lands and subsidizing 
activities so harmful to the earth and all its inhabitants. The statutes and 
regulations governing the use of public lands for grazing allow—and 
arguably compel—the end of the use of lands for this purpose. The 
environmental crisis facing the U.S. and the world necessitates that federal 
agencies take all available steps to mediate the impacts of global climate 
change and to use their resources in a way that is not detrimental to the 
natural environment and human health. Use of public lands for grazing 
undermines both of these considerations. Eliminating grazing on public 
lands will allow the lands to begin to recover. This will address many of the 
negative environmental effects of overgrazing and poor range management. 
At the same time, it will eliminate a significant cause of global climate 
change from the public lands, and allow the rangeland to ameliorate the 
impacts of climate change through sequestration of carbon. These are all 
goals that are in the public interest of the country going forward. It is time 
for BLM to act. 
 
